

Championing the Joint Force: A Job for the Public and our Political Leaders – Not Just Military Professionals Alone

by LGen. (Ret'd) Stuart Beare
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▶ Executive Summary

Canada's security interests and the mission of our Armed Forces – that is to defend Canada, defend North America and to promote peace and security abroad – may largely remain unchanged and timeless. The nature of the security environment, however, has not – nor will it be in the years to come.

An effective and relevant Canadian Armed Forces will continue to require capable, well-equipped and operationally-ready maritime, air and land forces who are largely raised and trained within our Army, Navy and Air Force. But in order for Defence to remain relevant and effective in an era of increased instability, volatility and unpredictability, our Armed Forces need the ability and capacity to match these with an increased understanding of what is going on, and preparedness for what is to come. This is the business of our military's Joint Forces – those beyond the tactical units that the services provide. It is the joint organizations and networks within the institution that generate intelligence, provide understanding and lead the partnering, planning, force posturing and practicing so essential to the anticipation of, preparation for, and conduct of, operations – in particular in a world of unrelenting complexity.

A decade after General Rick Hillier's extraordinary initiatives to transform our Armed Forces from a service-centric machine-age force to one focused on the business of operations, one that thinks and acts Canadian Forces (joint) first, we do see evidence of real progress in the approach to joint operations and improved appreciation of our military's joint functions and capabilities. Unlike the political and public calls for strong services and the modernization of their major platforms, however, this progress has been realized largely through efforts internal to the Armed Forces themselves. The initiative has been without political leadership and external policy top-cover, rendering this progress and its future vulnerable and reversible.

This paper describes the functions of the Joint Force; advocates for the capabilities they require to enable partnerships, enhance understanding and advance mission preparedness; and calls for unified leadership of the joint domain and over our military's joint culture. Our traditional international partners have travelled this road. They too see that clarity on joint functions, joint capability, joint domain leadership, and stewardship over joint culture are vital to their military's relevance and operational effectiveness – and to their agility and flexibility in the years to come. Their progress is the result of internal professional transformation, as well as the understanding of, and requirement by political leaders and modern defence policy to make this so. Here in Canada, the forming of new government this fall calls for a relook at Defence policy, providing new opportunity to invite that same political leadership and influence.

Joint functions, joint capabilities and clear joint leadership are vital to our military's relevance to, and effectiveness in, our national defence and operations. Joint Forces and the joint domain, like strong and capable Army, Navy and Air Forces, need to be led, resourced and fully engaged before planes fly, ships sail, and troops deploy. Joint-ness requires external understanding and proponents, and, within the Forces, a clearly identifiable champion. In Canada, these range from ambiguous to absent.

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Promouvoir la force interarmées : Une tâche pour le public et nos dirigeants politiques, pas seulement pour les militaires de carrière*

Lgénéral (ret) Stuart Beare

► Sommaire

Les intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité et la mission de nos Forces armées – défendre le Canada, défendre l’Amérique du Nord et promouvoir la paix et la sécurité à l’étranger – demeurent en grande partie inchangés et intemporels. Par contre, la nature du contexte sécuritaire n’est pas demeurée inchangée et ne le restera pas dans les années qui viennent.

Pour demeurer efficaces et pertinentes, les Forces armées canadiennes continueront de requérir des forces navales, aériennes et terrestres compétentes, bien équipées et opérationnelles, qui sont en grande partie rassemblées et entraînées au sein de notre Armée de terre, de notre Marine et de notre Force aérienne. Toutefois, pour que la défense demeure pertinente et efficace dans une ère d’instabilité, de volatilité et d’imprévisibilité accrues, nos Forces armées ont besoin d’une plus grande compréhension des événements en cours afin d’être prêtes en vue de ce qui se prépare. C’est là la tâche de notre Force interarmées, qui inclut et dépasse les unités tactiques fournies par les services. Les organisations et réseaux interarmées génèrent des renseignements, assurent la compréhension et dirigent le partenariat, la planification, le dispositif militaire et l’entraînement, des éléments essentiels pour prévoir, se préparer et mener des opérations, en particulier dans un monde d’une inextricable complexité.

Une décennie après les extraordinaires initiatives de l’ancien chef d’état-major de la défense (CEMD), le général Rick Hillier, pour transformer nos Forces armées, une force centrée sur le service de l’âge du machinisme, en une force axée sur les opérations, qui pense et agit en premier lieu en tant que Forces canadiennes (interarmées), nous voyons des signes de réels progrès dans l’approche des opérations interarmées. On remarque également une appréciation accrue des fonctions et capacités interarmées de nos forces militaires. Contrairement aux demandes politiques et publiques pour des services renforcés et la modernisation de leurs plateformes majeures, toutefois, ce progrès a été réalisé en grande partie grâce aux efforts internes des Forces armées

* Cette recherche a été soutenue financièrement en partie par le gouvernement du Canada via Diversification de l’économie de l’Ouest Canada.

elles-mêmes. L'initiative n'a bénéficié d'aucun leadership politique ni d'aucun appui politique externe, ce qui la rend vulnérable et réversible.

Le présent document a pour but de décrire les fonctions de la Force interarmées, de promouvoir la cause des capacités requises pour rendre possibles les partenariats, de rehausser la compréhension et la préparation avancée des missions et de demander un leadership unifié du domaine et de la culture interarmées de nos forces armées. Nos partenaires internationaux traditionnels ont parcouru cette route. Ils voient eux aussi que la clarté pour ce qui est des fonctions et de la capacité interarmées, du leadership du domaine interarmées et de la gestion de la culture interarmées est essentielle pour la pertinence et l'efficacité opérationnelle des forces armées. Cela est également essentiel pour leur agilité et leur flexibilité au cours des années qui viennent. Leur progrès est le résultat d'une transformation professionnelle interne, ainsi que de l'exigence de dirigeants politiques et d'une politique de défense moderne de parvenir à ce résultat. Ici au Canada, la constitution d'un nouveau gouvernement cet automne rend nécessaire un nouvel examen de la politique de défense, ce qui constitue une occasion d'encourager le même leadership et la même influence politiques.

Les fonctions et capacités interarmées et un leadership interarmées clair sont cruciaux pour la pertinence et l'efficacité de nos forces armées à l'égard de notre défense nationale et des opérations. Une Force interarmées et le domaine interarmées, tout comme des Forces armées, une Marine et une Force aérienne fortes et compétentes, doivent être dirigés, dotés de ressources et pleinement mobilisés avant que les avions ne volent, que les navires ne prennent la mer et que les troupes ne se déploient. L'interarmisation exige une compréhension et des promoteurs externes et, au sein des Forces, un champion clairement identifiable. Au Canada, toutefois, ceux-ci se distinguent par leur ambiguïté ou leur absence.

When the Canadian Armed Forces and National Defence make the agenda, it is usually a consequence of what is going on and should be done in the face of the crises of the day, or over debates on policy for the future. Issues range from internal challenges like the Deschamps Report on sexual misconduct, failures and underperformance in government programs to procure the major equipment and material so essential to the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the real limits in government investment affecting the training and operational readiness of our troops, to external challenges in national and international security we see playing out globally – most recently with the Syrian refugee crisis at the fore.

There are, as well, calls for Government to step back from the alligators closest to the boat in order to look longer term: to update and reframe our understanding of national security interests and objectives, to modernize Defence strategy, and to increase the proportion of our national wealth invested in our future security and defence.¹ We do need to see current challenges and future trends through the lens of what else is coming and where we need to get to, versus where we are today and what to do next. Canada does need to take a pull to the future versus a push from the past approach to our advancing our national security and defence interests – and to resourcing and shaping the future of our Canadian Armed Forces accordingly.²

Between these ends of the spectrum of public and political interest and debate, however, lies an incredibly important and inadequately championed range of activities and capabilities that the public, government and National Defence itself need to understand and advance if we are to remain effectively served by the Canadian Armed Forces today, and well defended in the future. While the political understanding of and focus on our military is predominantly on its services (the Army, Navy and Air Force), it is only by acting as a joint and integrated force (that is with functions, capabilities, and leadership inclusive of and beyond those of the services) that the Canadian Armed Forces can deliver results today, along with the agility and flexibility to remain effective in the future.

The joint domain and our military's Joint Forces have enjoyed some attention, resourcing and new leadership in the recent past, and real progress within the military profession to act as a joint and integrated team of teams has been made. That progress, however, has been due almost singularly to efforts internal to the Canadian Armed Forces themselves as they adapt to the extraordinary experiences of the last decade and a half, and to initiatives by uniformed leadership to promote more joint-ness and integration amongst those who serve. Clear public understanding of the Canadian Armed Forces as a joint and integrated team that requires joint capability and leadership - and political leadership to drive this understanding into enduring joint functions, capability, capacity and behaviour have been, and remain, largely absent.

¹ Paul H. Chapman, J.L. Granatstein, Grig. Gen Don McNamara, Hugh Segal: "A Roadmap to a Stronger Military," The National Post, 28 September 2015.

² Amongst these is "The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2015," by Ferry de Kerckhove and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

Public and political interest in events of the day remains important. Calls for national security and defence strategy review do need to persist. Advocacy for resources and modern platforms for our three services must remain strong. But if the Armed Forces are to continue to modernize and advance their effectiveness in the defence of Canada, as well as enabling those who serve to serve well, then public understanding and political leadership over our military's joint functions, joint capabilities and joint leadership must be advanced as well.

This paper is focused on growing advocacy for strategic leadership for the very real Joint³ – that is inclusive of and beyond the singular elements of Army, Navy and Air Forces – functions, capabilities, resources, leadership and culture required of and for an effective, relevant and modern Canadian Armed Forces. Unlike the individual services, understanding of Canadian Armed Forces joint functions, capabilities, resource requirements and leadership is elusive. It is hard to come by a clear vision that describes the Armed Forces (beyond that written internally) as a joint and integrated team. Direction to guide the joint domain is largely absent in policy and has no singular champion in the defence program. These factors render the progress that has been made reversible, joint capabilities and resources vulnerable, and the cultural journey within the Armed Forces themselves tenuous.

The potential for a future Defence Policy review and formulation of a modern Defence Strategy, and the engagement of an increasingly joint-experienced Canadian Armed Forces leadership under General Jonathan Vance's leadership today, offer opportunity to take these on. It is by requiring, directing and resourcing the Canadian Armed Forces to be and act as a joint and integrated Force that government can realize the full potential and full benefit of its investment in Defence, and assure that Canada is well postured and prepared to deal with a volatile and unpredictable future.

Ask a sailor, soldier, or airman what they do for a living and they might reply: "I sail ... I drive tanks ... I fly." When asked why, answers may vary but speak, at the end of the day, to this simply expressed (but demanding) mission: To defend Canada and North America, and to promote peace and security abroad.⁴ Sailing, flying, deploying on the land, all of these are essential elements that translate the words of security and defence into action and results. On their own, however, they do not and cannot get set conditions for success, nor fully get the job done. There are essential joint functions and capabilities – inclusive of and beyond those our Army, Navy and Air Force provide – that the Forces need to bring to bear *before, during, and after* any particular operational action in today's and the future security environment, and certainly before ships sail, planes fly, and troops march. Let's look at the joint functions first.

³ Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01 "Canadian Military Doctrine," defines Joint as an adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations in which elements of at least two services participate. Time, technology, and experience have led to a more organic understanding of joint to mean the integration of service capabilities within a joint framework of capabilities that come from within and beyond the services – command and control and communications systems, intelligence, surveillance, space, cyber, information operations, and operational support and sustainment.

⁴ Canadian Armed Forces are assigned three (what have been enduring) missions within "the Canada First Defence Strategy" of 2008: Defend Canada – by delivering excellence at home, Defend North America – by being a strong and reliable defence partner, Contribute to international peace and security – by projecting leadership abroad.

For those who lived it in uniform, the Cold War era was characterized by the acronym “SALY” – meaning “same as last year.” SALY perished in the era following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and no one expects it to re-emerge anytime soon. From the Russian led and proxy conflict on NATO’s eastern flank, to ISIS, to state and non-state cyberwarfare, to the collapse of order in the Middle East and North Africa, to proliferation, to the contest over maritime spaces, to the competition in control of outer space, to climate change and natural disasters (all of these being recent phenomena), we can see that instability and volatility are on the rise. From the former Yugoslavia civil war in the 1990s to the emergence of ISIS and Russian aggression today, few, if any, of these challenges were anticipated. While the Defence mission has remained largely enduring, the nature of the security environment has not. It will remain increasingly challenged and unpredictable.⁵

Increases in instability, volatility and unpredictability need to be matched by an increased effort in **understanding** what is going on and what is coming, and in enhanced **preparedness** for what may come next. First class and operationally-ready⁶ forces from the Army, Navy and Air Force are included in this preparedness. The real work in understanding and preparedness⁷ is led and performed not by the services themselves, but by the joint and integrated forces (which includes significant elements of the services) of the Armed Forces.

Canada’s security and defence interests are challenged in all domains – at sea, in the air, on the land, in space and cyber, and in the information (influence) domain. **Understanding** what is happening, what’s coming, and what is at stake requires that the Forces have the capability and capacity to observe, analyse and report in and across all of these domains – with technology-based and human sensors – and to do this with partners. This is a team effort: for Government, across Ministries and security partners at home, and across military and security force alliances and partnerships abroad. Networking, collecting and analyzing information, formulating shared understanding horizontally, and integrating that understanding from the national to tactical levels is a full-time undertaking for the Joint Force, requiring process, people in the right places with the right partners, sensors, technology, and leadership. Understanding the before, during, and after conflict and crisis is a key function of and contribution by the Joint Force to government, to its partners, and is ultimately vital to those deployed or about to deploy into harm’s way.

The Armed Forces rarely undertake missions by themselves. Domestic operations are in support of provincial or federal partners. NORAD is a bi-national partnership for continental defence. International peace and security operations range in combinations of alliance, coalition and Canadian whole-of-government efforts. **Partnerships** are essential to the provision of

⁵ “The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2015,” by Ferry de Kerckhove and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, p. 4 to 7. “The Future Security Environment 2013-2040,” Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, p. 127.

⁶ The Auditor General of Canada defines readiness as: a measure of the ability of a Canadian unit to undertake an approved task. Readiness includes several aspects, including personnel, training and equipment. “Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, December 2012”.

⁷ Preparedness is not an official term within Canadian Armed Forces lexicon, nor does it enjoy shared understanding within and outside of the military. The Article written by Paul Johnston, Chris Madsen, Paul Mitchell, and Steven Moritsugu “A Canadian Approach to the Operational Level of Command,” Canadian Military Journal Volume 14, No. 4, goes a long way to describing it and offering a platform for its further development and entrenchment in military, defence, and broader security sector behaviour.

understanding, not just the threat and risk environment, but also the assessment, capabilities and intentions of security and defence partners at home and abroad. Partnerships establish – in advance of any particular action – conditions for mission success. These include plans, postured forces, positioned equipment, materiel and supplies, lines of communication, host nation agreements, supply chains, and practicing (exercising in military parlance) these plans together.

Strategic and operational **planning** allows partners to anticipate where crisis or contingencies may arise, to establish the information exchange agreements and architectures to focus understanding, and identify indicators and warnings. It allows partners to inform strategic choices about force **posturing** and operational readiness; to establish in advance provisions for host nation over-flight, access, basing and support; and to provision and position supplies and secure air, maritime and land lift capacities. Planning allows teams to then **practise** – testing assumptions, confirming posture and readiness choices, validating logistics and supply and the full range of operational support. Practicing is essential to creating the person-to-person trust and relationships within and beyond the Forces so essential to mission success, and to the agility and resilience of partnerships to withstand shocks, exploit opportunities and to persist in the face of real challenges.

Partnering, planning, posturing forces and practicing represent, in essence, mission **preparedness** – a key operational capability in its own right. **Understanding** and **preparedness** are the business of the **Joint Force** and **Joint Leadership**, and require **joint capabilities** with the people, time, equipment, and financial resources to match. Key amongst these are the human capacity and communications networks (meaning headquarters) that link people across the Forces and its services, and with civilian and international partners; the information collection sensors and intelligence networks layered from the national to tactical levels - and horizontally across agencies and with trusted international partners; operations in space to ensure communications, navigation, earth observation and control of space assets; and the preservation of our cyber networks with capacity to deny an adversary theirs. The military calls this C4ISR, or “Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.” Responsibility for C4ISR is split between the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command, Assistant Deputy Minister Information Management and the Service Chiefs, with only limited coordination.

Finally is the operational support that prepares in theatre conditions for force deployment, reception, integration and mission support from personnel, to finance, to supply, to maintenance, to health services, to engineering and force protection – the full gamut of vital support functions without which an operationally-engaged force cannot succeed nor survive.

C4ISR, space and cyber networks, and operational support capacities are all joint force responsibilities and **joint capabilities** – capabilities that are and must be fully engaged before operations occur and that are in full demand once committed. These, and the people and structures required to operate them, are not overhead.

A government committed to the effective defence of Canada, and to a relevant, effective and agile Armed Forces must necessarily be committed to a modern Joint Force – delivering the full suite of joint functions, enabled by the full suite of joint capabilities, and operating under

unifying joint leadership. Absent these, strategic understanding of the security environment will remain elusive. The range of choices available to government action – and speed and effectiveness of response – will be dramatically constrained, and the risks faced by troops deployed in harm's way, much less robustly mitigated.

In 2005, then Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier launched a Canadian Forces transformation – seeking to move the Forces from a service-centric, machine age, Cold War baseline to one focused on being able to understand, to be capable in, and to be relevant to the security and defence challenges of the day, and those to come.⁸ His transformation principles were: to be loyal to Canada and the Canadian Forces first; to operate via command-centred decision making; to assign clear responsibilities and authorities for commanders; to act as an operationally focused force; to promote leadership emphasizing mission command; and to pursue institutional alignment across the forces and with the Department of National Defence. Noting a strong bias for a service-based professional foundation, General Hillier stimulated the thinking and behaviour of the Canadian Forces to acting as a Joint Force in the first instance. He took steps to advance that understanding and to establish its leadership internally within the profession. He was incredibly successful in dislodging the profession from a decade and a half of post-Cold War inertia and in firing up the imagination and creative leadership of what had been a less than united General and Flag Officer cohort. He created the organizational capacity and clear authority for the conduct of all operations at home and abroad through the establishment of three Operational Commands and Special Operations Forces Command (Joint Commands) – and the assurance of their operational support. In addition, he was masterful in connecting Canadians with their fellow citizens in uniform.⁹

At the beginning of the transformation effort, General Hillier garnered significant enthusiasm and enjoyed substantial buy-in from military leaders. However, the methods used to drive transformation did eventually lead to an atmosphere of competition (in vision and resources) between the Canadian Armed Forces and the bureaucracy, between the services and the new Joint Command structures, and even between some of the Service Chiefs and the CDS himself.¹⁰ The creation of the Operational Commands and the language of transformation did advance some joint functions, joint capability, joint leadership and joint culture – but did so absent political leadership, written policy, strategy, and resource assurance. General Hillier rightly described transformation as a journey and not an end state. However, clarity about the vision and direction for the future were left unanswered. Following his departure, the journey to an enduring operationally focused, Canadian Forces first, and joint culture was left without a clearly identifiable steward.

In 2011, Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie and the Canadian Forces Transformation Team tabled a Report on Canadian Forces Transformation offering forty-three recommendations for

⁸ Devin Conley and Dr. Eric Ouellet, “The Canadian Forces and Military Transformation – An Elusive Quest for Efficiency”, the Canadian Army Journal 14.1.

⁹ Philippe Lagasse, “A Mixed Legacy: General Hillier and Canadian Defence, 2005-2008.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association 2009 Conference, Carleton University, 27 May 2009.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, Conley and Ouellet, and Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Michael Jeffery, “Inside Canadian Forces Transformation,” Canadian Military Journal 2010, Volume 10, Number 2.

consideration for transformation round two.¹¹ Whereas General Hillier's effort targeted the professional understanding and then the transformed operational engagement and effectiveness of the Forces (professional hearts and minds as it were) the round two efforts focused on resources and efficiency – less transformation and more organizational modernization. Successive government-led resource reductions did necessitate a clear look at resources. The report, however, provided little that would either challenge or advance General Hillier's transformation principles.

Nevertheless, one of the report's recommendations led in 2012 to the integration of command over Canadian Armed Forces operations under a singular Commander, within a new Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC).¹² The integration of three operational commands into one, and the unification of the defence operational mission – to defend Canada, North America, and support peace and security abroad – within that singular command, in particular in understanding, partnering and practicing, has had some unifying effect in Canadian Forces culture and behaviour, and in key relationships with operational partners.

Authority for and leadership over the joint force capabilities set: command and control and communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, space, cyber, and operational support, however, remain ambiguous. A singular Joint Operations Commander exists – but just who the joint capability and culture “Bubba” is remains unclear.¹³ Achieving a Canadian Forces-first and joint culture is challenged by persistent competition for scarce resources between services and the evolving Joint Command and capability effort. Even within Canadian Armed Forces leadership and the professional military education system, little has improved in terms of identifying leadership and methods to purposefully advance joint culture throughout the Forces. While pieces of the joint agenda have advanced, joint-ness and leadership over the joint domain have yet to become firmly entrenched – within and beyond the military profession.

It took a failure in Vietnam and an act of Congress to compel the long road to lasting joint culture, capability and behaviour within the United States (US) military. Twenty-nine years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act, unified and geographic joint commands persist. Their responsibilities, functions and capabilities to assure understanding, persistent partnering and mission preparedness – as well as the assurance of joint and integrated action in operations - is entrenched. The organizational and cultural journey to this end was long and is not necessarily over, but it remains embedded and well-led politically, in policy, and within the US military profession itself.¹⁴

Closer in size and structure to the Canadian experience, the United Kingdom (UK) Armed Forces responded to lessons from the Falklands war and the demands of the Balkan crises by establishing a Joint Operational Commander and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in the mid-1990s.¹⁵ While this unified the command of operations, it was only in 2012, based on

¹¹ Martin Shadwick, “The Report on Transformation 2011,” *The Canadian Military Journal* 2011, Volume 10, No. 1.

¹² National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Backgrounder on Canadian Forces Transformation: New Operational Command and Control Structure, May 11, 2012.

¹³ Johnston, Madsen, Mithcell, Moritsugu, “A Canadian Approach to the Operational Level of Command”.

¹⁴ James R Locher III, “Has it Worked – the Goldwater Nichols Reform Act?,” *Naval War College Review*, 2001, Vol LIV, No. 4.

¹⁵ PJHQ History, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk>.

the political direction resulting from the 2011 Levene Report on Defence Reform, that the UK established Joint Forces Command – which includes the Permanent Joint Headquarters – to lead and oversee the entirety of the Joint Force policy, doctrine, professional education, training, structure, capabilities and operations for the British military. The report wrote that: “We do not, however, believe that clarification in this way (the role of the services in supporting joint efforts) will be enough. The future character of conflict will increase yet further the demand for integrated capability and joint enablers. There is evidence that joint enabling capabilities do not receive the priority they merit in the single service force structure. We therefore believe there is a strong case for developing a Joint Forces Command (JFC) to deliver output focussed capabilities and capitalise on potential synergies to deliver enhanced joint operational effect.”¹⁶ Even during a period of substantial resource reduction since 2010, the UK has invested in joint functions, capability, structure and leadership to drive integration and joint behaviour across the Force, indeed advancing under a clearly identified and empowered joint leader, an enhanced joint culture.

Australia split the middle with the establishment of Australian Defence Force Joint Operations Command (AUS JOC) in 2004 and by appointing a three-star commander in 2008. Commander AUS JOC leads all Australian operations, has the authority to direct preparedness functions, and is partnered with the office of the Vice Chief of the Defence Force to ensure the informed guidance, design and ultimate provision of joint capabilities to the Force.¹⁷ As in the US, UK, and Canada, services continue to lead in the development and generation of their tactical forces and capabilities, and they do provide significant command and control, intelligence, and operational support capacities to this commander. Responsibilities for mission preparedness, the conduct of operations, and delivery of operational support are his. This joint operations capability and cultural reform effort was founded, like those in the US and UK, on significant political engagement, clarity in defence policy, and resource backed strategy.

Notwithstanding their differences, all three of these familiar partners observed that strong services remained essential to Defence, but that these on their own were unable to achieve real effectiveness in the defence mission – nationally to the tactical levels – on their own. They recognized that where functions could and should be common, service-centred solutions introduced inefficiencies and reduced effectiveness of the overall Force. Mandated politically, directed in strategy, programmed in structure and resources, and led comprehensively through clarity in command, education, assignment and experience - their journey towards joint-ness still was still challenging, and hard work remains for these militaries (as it does within the Canadian Armed Forces).

Our Armed Force’s organic efforts to advance operational understanding, to nurture the partnering, planning, posturing and practicing functions of mission preparedness, and to reinforce joint capability, leadership and culture, have delivered some real progress. This progress, however, isn’t sufficient to fully meet the demands of today, nor the challenges to come. Neither is it founded and grounded in government-led policy, strategy, or the program

¹⁶ The Levene Report on Defence Reform - an independent report into the structure and management of the Ministry of Defence, June 2011, p. 45.

¹⁷ ADF command – general, <http://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/security-general/adf-command-general/>.

that apportion resources – and is, consequently, reversible. Nor is progress within Canadian Armed Forces joint culture necessarily enduring if, within the force, the question of who is really in charge (shy of the CDS him/herself) continues to be debated.

Government has expended significant effort to rebrand the Canadian Armed Forces as the sum of its key parts, our justifiably well-recognized services: the Army, Navy and Air Force. Whether seen as celebrating and perpetuating our military's heritage or returning to the past, this rebranding does nothing to advance the joint agenda, nor advance political and public understanding that Canada's men and women in uniform are Canada's Armed Forces first – proud to serve in their Services – but ultimately capable of success in their mission by virtue of being a joint and integrated team of teams that live within a joint and integrated Armed Forces. Declarations of pride in the men and women of the Army, Navy, Air Forces and Special Forces in operations are welcome, but fail to acknowledge the vital work of the Joint Force – and the some 20,000 members of the Forces who are not serving within environmental commands.

Internally to the Canadian Armed Forces – leadership over advancing the mission preparedness agenda, and the sum of joint operations, joint capability, and joint culture is left in the hands of the CDS alone. With all the other responsibilities and demands on his/her plate – it is clear that some essential elements of this joint agenda will continue to wait before they become fully addressed.

Effectiveness in defending Canada is assured before crises occur, through enhanced understanding, effective partnerships and the mission preparedness activities that enable planning, posturing and practicing with those partners. Command and control systems, intelligence and surveillance networks, space and cyber as unique operational domains, and the full gamut of operational support capabilities are the joint capabilities that enable this understanding, partnering, and opportunity to practice, replicating as much as possible the conditions that need to be set and that our troops would see in an actual operation. Mission preparedness provides invaluable understanding to government and partners, and assures the Forces ability to get to, endure, survive, and succeed in operations.

It is clear who within the Canadian Armed Forces leads in the development and generation of land, maritime and air operational capabilities – but it is less clear who is the ultimate authority over these same things in the joint domain. Policy, Strategy, and the Defence Program are long in targeting the sustainment and development of a strong Army, Navy and Air Force. Policy, Strategy and Program – and organizational practice and behaviour – are less explicit and clear about these in the vital Joint Operations Functions, Capabilities, and leadership that Canada requires. Canadian Armed Forces leadership over the joint elements of their institution and in driving forward a professional joint culture remains ambiguous.

As a new Government embarks on its mandate and turns to a strategic look at defence strategy, procurement, as well as dealing with the crises of the day, there exists a new opportunity to take stock of and entrench the tenets of mission preparedness, to encode preparedness functions in policy and strategy, to relook the joint capability investment and oversight in the Defence Program, and to identify clear military leadership over the joint agenda – including our own military's joint culture. Political enthusiasm for strong services is needed, and a commitment to

recapitalizing their major capabilities is absolutely essential. We need the same for the Joint Force and the joint domain.

Organic efforts within the Canadian Armed Forces have had varying degrees of success in advancing the ball down the field. As our more familiar partners have witnessed through their own experiences, it takes political understanding and leadership, the requirement by policy, the assurance of capability through program and strategy, and clarity in professional leadership to progress, and to sustain that progress. Today's cohort of strategic military leaders gets this, and is assuredly well placed to offer their professional advice on how to get there.

▶ **About the Author**

Stu Beare is a thirty-six year veteran of the Canadian Armed Forces, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. Retiring at the rank of Lieutenant-General in 2014, he has commanded at every level – Battery, Regiment, Brigade, Land Force Area, Land Force Doctrine and Training System, Expeditionary Forces Command, and lastly Canadian Joint Operations Command. He led the Canadian Force’s efforts in land warfare and training during the height of our combat operations in Afghanistan, and then led Joint Force and Joint Capability Development as Chief of Force Development. He commanded troops in major domestic operations here at home, and overseas including Canada’s last rotation in Cyprus (‘93), twice in Bosnia including a year as Commander Multi-National Brigade NW (‘03-04), and in NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, where he led and worked alongside scores of partners in guiding the expansion, modernization, and professionalization of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior and five national Police forces (‘10-11). He has a BEng from CMR and RMC (‘83), and is a graduate of multiple Command and Staff programs including the Technical Staff Course run by the UK’s Royal Military College of Science and Cranfield University. He loves soldiering and working with the soldiers, sailors, and airmen and women who serve in uniform. His family, like so many others, serves and has served – and he is a fervent champion of those who enable us to serve. He remains engaged with his former profession and partners by supporting CDAI, as a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and as a working group member within the University of Ottawa’s Centre for International Studies-led 2015 Ottawa Forum. Oh, and he became this year a licenced pilot – much to the dismay of his old friends and partners in NORAD!