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AN URBAN NATION: THE SHIFTING FORTUNES OF CANADIAN CITIES

Kevin McQuillan and Michael Laszlo

SUMMARY

Canada is not immune to the dramatic economic changes that are transforming society in other industrialized countries, where once-thriving factory and resource towns are dying, while educated knowledge workers in more cosmopolitan centres prosper. Where this growing inequality between communities and social classes takes root, worrisome social and political developments can develop, such as the polarization occurring in the U.S. and parts of Europe.

Canada's 10 largest cities have been the primary driver of economic growth in recent years, and Canada is unusual in the degree to which its population is concentrated in a relatively small number of cities. To date, Canada's largest cities have been doing well and Canada has not so far seen the contrast so evident in the United States between highly successful cities and large cities in decline, such as Detroit and Cleveland.

However, a ranking of national cities using "vitality" scores highlights a growing inequality between Canada's largest cities and its midsize and smaller cities. In many communities in the Atlantic region, in Quebec beyond its two major cities, and in the northern regions of B.C. and Ontario, harder times may lie ahead. Their populations are stagnating, their employment rates for people of prime working age are distressingly low, and their proportion of low-income families is high. Urban decline can lead to further poverty, significant population aging and more pressure on higher levels of government to provide services that these communities can no longer afford.

The strength of cities primarily revolves today around human capital and the ability of a community to develop or attract a highly skilled labour force. If Canada is to avoid a future where just a few cities are economic and demographic "winners" and the rest are "losers," policy-makers will need to consider how to help keep midsized cities from being increasingly left behind, whether that be through diversifying immigration patterns, targeted investment outside large urban areas, or other approaches. The pandemic, which has led some employers to rethink the need to keep workers in expensive big-city downtown offices, could create new opportunities to reinvigorate smaller, lower-cost centres.

However, without a change in the pattern of divergence between Canada's dynamic cities and the rest, the societal and political strife that has unfolded elsewhere could someday happen here.

INTRODUCTION

Canada is an urban nation and the proportion of the population living in cities continues to grow. About three of every four Canadians live in cities of at least 100,000 residents and more than half live in our 10 largest cities. Yet in Canada, as in many other advanced industrial societies, cities are following very different paths. While some are experiencing growth and prosperity, others are facing population loss and economic decline. These varying paths present different types of challenges for policy-makers. Housing shortages, skyrocketing rents, and burgeoning numbers of homeless often follow in the wake of rapid urban growth. In struggling cities, high levels of unemployment and poverty, abandoned buildings and deteriorating public spaces challenge cities that are often facing declining streams of revenue.

While the contrast among Canadian cities is not as stark as that seen in some other societies, there are, as we will see, striking contrasts in both the demographic and economic fortunes among Canada's urban areas. This paper has two goals: first, to chart the demographic changes that have occurred in the Canadian urban network in this century; second, to explore the factors associated with growth and prosperity versus stagnation and decline.

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF URBANIZATION

While cities continue to grow, the pattern of urbanization has changed in important ways as a result of the shifting fortunes of different industries. Twentieth-century industrialization was built around resource extraction and manufacturing. Industries located in places where natural resources were located (oil and gas, mining) or where land, energy and labour were abundant (manufacturing). The result was a diversified pattern of urban development. Major factories were often located in midsized cities and resource development sustained the livelihoods of people living in smaller cities and towns. Two developments worked to undermine this situation, however. Increasing mechanization led to the downsizing of the labour force. In major industries such as autos and steel, factories began to make significant reductions in employment, which had substantial impact on the communities in which their operations were located. Even more devastating was the growing number of plant closures that resulted when increasingly open international trade shifted production to Asia and other parts of the developing world. As factories, mines, and sawmills closed, many cities and towns saw their fortunes decline.

By contrast, cities that are centres of new and growing industries have flourished. Large metropolises, such as New York, London, Toronto, and Tokyo, have benefitted from their dominance in finance, professional services, communications, and higher education and continue to grow and prosper. Other cities, where rapidly growing companies in new industries such as high-tech chose to locate, have also done well. The result has been a world of winners and losers. McKinsey estimates that 60 per

cent of global GDP is now produced by just 600 cities.[1] This concentration of leading industries has led some analysts to refer to "superstar" cities that dominate in fields such as technology and finance.

The American example is most often cited to illustrate these trends. The surge in employment in technology industries has boosted the fortunes of cities such as San Francisco, San Jose, Calif. and Seattle, that are the home of rapidly growing companies such as Facebook, Alphabet, and Microsoft. In contrast, cities in what has come to be called the Rust Belt have seen their populations and local economies stagnate or even decline in the face of widespread factory closures. This has been true not only in the larger cities of the Midwest, such as Detroit and Cleveland, but among many midsize cities where industrial jobs have vanished. Youngstown, Ohio, a once-booming centre of steel production, saw its population peak around 663,000 in 1970, but the estimated 2019 population is only 536,000, a decline of almost 20 per cent.

While the American case is in some ways distinctive, reflecting the U.S.'s leadership in many areas of technology, elements of this pattern are evident in other advanced economies. In the United Kingdom, traditional industrial centres in the north of the country have fallen on hard times, while London and the southeast of England are growing. In France, the industrial north and east, long the centres of textile production, coal, and steel, have suffered decline, while the huge Paris region and parts of the south have profited. And in Germany, the Rhineland, the home of traditional German industry, has lost ground to cities in the south, including Munich and Stuttgart, where new industries have flourished.

Canada, too, has seen industrial decline, especially in manufacturing, that has weakened some of our midsized cities. Many midsize Ontario cities, including London, Windsor, Leamington and Sarnia, have seen major employers close their doors.[2] Difficulties in key resource industries, including mining, forestry, and fisheries, have also led to outmigration and population decline in smaller towns and cities across the country. Prior to the recent crisis in Canada's energy industry, these declines were offset in some cases by the boom in oil and gas that produced rapid growth in a number of cities and towns, especially in Alberta and Saskatchewan. With the downturn in both prices and investment since 2015, however, growth rates in many of these communities have declined or even turned negative, and it will be difficult for many to sustain previous levels of employment.

The economic and social consequences associated with the growth and decline of cities have provoked considerable debate about the future. A major concern is growing inequality between communities and social classes, and the potential link between

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1 Richard Dobbs, Sven Smit, Jaana Remes, James Manyika, Charles Roxburgh, and Alejandra Restrepo, "Urban World: Mapping the economic power of cities," McKinsey and Co., March 1, 2011, https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/urbanization/urban-world-mapping-the-economic-power-of-cities#, accessed August 6, 2020.

2 An incomplete but useful list of major plant closings in Ontario is available at "Ontario plant closures since 2008," Google Sheets, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1w28zIrkQZqCYImPcAYqZM-MczAiuDxUOxVxAdzLLcqg/edit#gid=0, accessed January 10, 2021.

economic change and worrisome social and political developments, including the potential for political polarization.[3]

The contrast between the most successful cities and the rest can be overdone, of course. Even superstar cities struggle with a variety of issues: prohibitively high housing costs, congestion, and homelessness.[4] Meanwhile, many cities and towns beyond the superstar class have found important niches that have allowed them to thrive.[5] Nonetheless, understanding the factors that lead to success or failure is a critical public policy challenge; urban decline is associated with significant population aging, rising poverty, and pressure on higher levels of government to provide services that local communities struggle to afford. Before exploring the situation for Canadian cities, let us first turn to a brief review of the major explanations of urban growth and decline.

WHY DO CITIES THRIVE?

Even the world's leading cities have their ups and downs. New York hovered on the brink of bankruptcy in the 1970s, leading to the infamous New York Daily News headline "(President) Ford to New York: Drop Dead," a reference to the refusal of the federal government to offer the city a bailout. Shanghai, now China's largest and leading city, saw its population and influence dip during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. So, it is not surprising to find that once-thriving cities such as Detroit or Manchester, U.K. are facing hard times, while other urban centres such as San Francisco, Singapore, and Munich, Germany are flourishing. Profound economic and political changes can strengthen or undermine the health of cities. Discussions of recent trends in urban places have focused on the ability of cities to attract and retain companies that drive key industries. In the past, decisions on where to locate production were influenced by geographic factors, such as proximity to essential resources and to efficient transportation networks. Certainly, the availability of labour was important as well, although the focus was more on the quantity and cost of labour rather than the availability of specific skills. But with the shift to industries such as technology, finance, pharmaceuticals, and communications, the focus is now on the quality of human capital. Companies compete for high-skilled and innovative employees to drive their success. Moreover, as Moretti has argued, there is an increasing premium on locating in a city with a rich concentration of skilled people working in close proximity, a phenomenon he refers to as "agglomeration."[6] This concentration of talent in particular industries leads to an accelerated flow of information that drives innovation. Thus, despite the high costs of both land and labour in superstar cities, investors consider those costs worthwhile if it places their employees at the centre of the action. This

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3 Richard Florida, *The New Urban Crisis* (New York: Basic Books, 2017) provides an important overview.

4 Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai, "Superstar Cities," *American Journal of Economic Policy* (November 2013), 5-4: 167-199.

5 Sylvette Puissant and Claude Lacour, "Mid-Sized French Cities and their niche competitiveness," *Cities* (2011), 28: 433-443.

6 Enrico Moretti, *The New Geography of Jobs* (Boston and New York: Mariner Books).

drive towards concentration in a variety of leading industries contributes to the growing gap between the "best and the rest" and makes it harder for declining cities to catch up.

This trend of greater concentration of employment has come as a surprise to many observers. Classical economic theory would suggest that as prices for both land and labour rise in the most successful cities, investors should seek out lower-cost centres for new investment. Added to that, the growth of electronic communications would seem to limit the need to concentrate labour in certain places. Telecommuting allows companies to decentralize operations, with more people working from home or at sites outside the company headquarters. Yet, as Muro points out, despite the efforts of many cities to attract new industries, the major technology centres in the U.S. are becoming more dominant.[7]

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic raises new questions about the benefits of agglomeration, however. More and more people are working from home or coming to their place of employment on a limited basis. Leading cities, where available office space was limited and very expensive, are now facing soaring vacancy rates. Will these trends continue post-pandemic? Will this offer a chance for other cities to attract new businesses and new residents? Will smaller communities, able to provide more space at lower cost, come to look more attractive to people able to work from home? Despite the pronouncements made by analysts on both sides of this debate, it is simply too early to say. There is no doubt, however, that the pandemic will influence the future path for cities and will create a host of new challenges as cities attempt to retool for an uncertain future.

THE CANADIAN URBAN SETTING

We begin our look at the Canadian urban network by examining population growth in Canadian cities using census data from 2001 to 2016 and population estimates for 2020.[8] Statistics Canada classes all communities with a population of 10,000 or greater into one of two categories: Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA), which have a population greater than 100,000 and an urban core greater than 50,000; and Census Agglomerations (CA), which must have a core population of at least 10,000. While this categorization is useful for many purposes, grouping together the Toronto CMA, with an estimated 2020 population of over 6.5 million, with much smaller centres, such as Trois-Rivieres, Que. (163,287) or Peterborough, Ont. (131,939), obscures some of the most important differences among urban places that we wish to examine. Thus, in this analysis, we have divided the CMA category into two groups: Canada's top 10 cities by

7 Mark Muro and Robert Atkinson, "Countering America's Regional Economic Disparities is Going to Take More than Hope," American Enterprise Institute, February 2020.

8 All of the data used in the analysis are drawn from the censuses of Canada available on the Statistics Canada website (https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/census). The most recent estimates of urban populations from Statistics Canada are accessible at: Annual demographic estimates, census metropolitan areas and census agglomerations: Interactive dashboard, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/71-607-x/71-607-x2020003-eng.htm.

population and the remaining CMAs. This allows for a special focus on the 10 largest cities, which comprise more than half of the Canadian population and have been the most important drivers of the economy.

Before we discuss the results of the analysis, it is important to remember that the cities included in each category shift over time. Cities can "graduate" to a higher category if their population increases. Lethbridge, Alta. for example, became a CMA in 2011, when its population surpassed 100,000. Cities whose population core falls below 10,000 can be "retired" as CAs. Kitimat, B.C. saw its population decline from 10,283 in 2001 to 8,987 in 2006 and was no longer included in the small-city (10,000 – 99,999) category in 2006. Finally, some communities can disappear from the database because of reclassification. Saint Jean-sur-Richelieu, Que., a community with a population of 92,394 in 2011, was absorbed by the Montreal CMA and does not appear as an independent CA in the 2016 census.

We begin our look at the evolution of Canada's urban population by presenting data in Table 1 on the proportion of Canadians living in the three categories of cities from 2001 to 2020. The data confirm that Canada is a highly urbanized society and growing more so. The number of Canadians living in the 10 largest CMAs rose by more than 5 million over the period, while the proportion living in the top 10 increased from 52.2 per cent in 2001 to 55.8 per cent in 2020.

Table 1. Population of Three Categories of Cities and Share of National Population, 2001–20

Year	Top 10 cities		Other cities 100,000+			Cities 10,000–99,999			
	Population	Per cent of National Population	Population	Per cent of National Population	Number of Cities	Population	Per cent of National Population	Number of Cities	All Cities 10,000+ as per cent of National Population
2001	15,540,368	51.8	4,799,834	16.0	25	3,746,346	12.5	109	80.3
2006	16,664,646	52.7	5,058,446	16.0	25	3,908,465	12.4	109	81.1
2011	18,174,861	54.3	5,519,226	16.5	27	3,923,278	11.7	110	82.5
2016	19,378,440	55.1	6,181,315	17.6	31	3,673,373	10.5	111	83.2
2020	21,211,752	55.8	6,768,630	17.8	31	3,889,026	10.2	111	83.8
Increase 2001–2020	36.5%		41.0%			3.8%			

Source: Statistics Canada, "2016 Census of Population," Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-400-X2016001.

The number living in the midsize cities increased sharply as well, growing by almost 2 million. Note that this increase was driven in part by the larger number of midsize cities, as six more communities passed the 100,000 mark during the 19-year period. By contrast, the number of people living in the country's smaller cities remained almost constant, and thus the proportion who lived in cities with populations between 10,000 and 100,000 declined from 12.9 per cent in 2001 to just 10.2 per cent in 2020. Moreover, the percentage living in towns with fewer than 10,000 people and in

Canada's rural areas fell to just 16.2 per cent in 2020. The data underline the fact that the population is increasingly concentrating in larger urban areas.

While the concentration of population in large metropolises is occurring in all advanced societies, Canada is in some ways striking for the degree of concentration in a relatively small number of cities. Table 2 shows the population of the 10 largest cities in Canada and the United States and the cumulative share of the population living in these cities. While over 55 per cent of Canadians live in the top 10, only 26.3 per cent of Americans reside in the 10 largest cities. Indeed, the proportion of Canada's population living in Toronto and Montreal surpasses the proportion in America's 10 largest cities. At almost 17 per cent, the share of Canadians living in Toronto is roughly equal to the proportion of Americans living in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Houston, the five largest metropolises in the United States.

Table 2. Population Totals and Cumulative Share for 10 Largest Canadian and U.S. Cities, 2019

City	Population	Cumulative Total	Cumulative Share	City	Population	Cumulative Total	Cumulative Share
Toronto	6,462,770	6,462,770	17.2	**New York**	19,216,182	19,216,182	6.0
Montreal	4,333,041	10,795,811	28.7	**Los Angeles**	13,214,799	32,430,981	9.9
Vancouver	2,706,793	13,502,604	35.0	**Chicago**	9,458,539	41,889,520	12.8
Calgary	1,514,029	15,016,633	39.9	**Dallas**	7,573,136	49,462,656	15.1
Edmonton	1,442,805	16,459,438	43.8	**Houston**	7,066,141	56,528,797	17.2
Ottawa-Gatineau	1,438,083	17,897,521	47.6	**Washington**	6,280,487	62,809,284	19.1
Winnipeg	844,165	18,741,686	49.9	**Miami**	6,166,488	68,975,772	21.0
Quebec	825,150	19,566,836	52.1	**Philadelphia**	6,102,434	75,078,206	22.9
Hamilton	795,176	20,362,012	54.2	**Atlanta**	6,020,364	81,098,570	24.7
Kitchener-Waterloo-Cambridge	581,954	20,943,966	55.7	**Phoenix**	4,948,203	86,046,773	26.2

Sources: Statistics Canada, Table 17-10-0135-01, "Population estimates, July 1, by census metropolitan area and census agglomeration, 2016 boundaries." United States Census Bureau, "2019 Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin," https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-kits/2020/population-estimates-detailed.html.

Arguably, the greater dispersion of the American population across its network of large cities has been a benefit. Some of the most successful cities that are home to rapidly growing industries in the tech sector fall outside the top 10, including San Francisco, Seattle, Austin, Tex. and San Jose, Calif. All, of course, are very large cities by Canadian standards. The San Francisco metropolitan area, which includes Oakland and Berkeley, Calif. would be the second-largest city in Canada, and Austin, Tex. would rank as Canada's fourth-largest city. Whether the small number of major urban centres has

impeded Canada's ability to compete in the new industries is an important question for urban geographers and economists.[9]

In Table 3, we present another angle on urban growth by examining the mean rate of growth for cities in each category. The data show that it is Canada's largest cities that have experienced the fastest growth.[10] Rates of increase across all four time periods are highest for the top 10 cities. The average rate of increase for the midsize cities exceeded that of the smaller communities in all time periods and the gap was largest in the period 2016–20.

Table 3. Population Increase (Per Cent) by Size of Community, 2001–20

Category of City		2001–2006	2006–2011	2011–2016	2016–2020
Top 10	Mean	6.7	8.0	7.1	6.5
	Range	(2.7–13.4)	(4.1–12.6)	(3.7–14.6)	(3.4–9.6)
Midsize	Mean	4.8	4.9	3.9	5.8
	Range	(–3.1–19.2)	(–4.2–11.4)	(–2.9–12.5)	(1.2–10.0)
Small	Mean	3.4	4.0	3.5	2.9
	Range	(–12.6–46.7)	(–36.6–43.0)	(–9.3–19.6)	(–7.0–14.4)

Source: Statistics Canada, Table 17-10-0135-01, "Population estimates, July 1, by census metropolitan area and census agglomeration, 2016 boundaries."

It is striking to look at the range in the rate of increase for the different categories. There has been variation in the pace of growth among the largest cities, but it has been modest. All 10 cities grew in each time period. Calgary and Edmonton saw very rapid growth, a reflection of the resource boom through much of the period, but even Quebec City, which grew at the slowest pace, saw its population increase by over 20 per cent during the 19-year period. Striking as well is the continued growth of the Toronto CMA, which increased by 40 per cent in the period and now holds an estimated 6,555,205 people. Indeed, if we were to add the populations for the contiguous CMAs of Hamilton and Oshawa, Ont. the area as a whole has a population of over 7.5 million, meaning that approximately one in five Canadians live in that urban space.

Canada's midsize cities range in size from Red Deer, Alta., with just over 100,000, to London, Ont., with almost half a million people. Collectively, these cities were home to 17.8 per cent of Canadians in 2020, roughly equivalent to the population of the Toronto CMA. As a group, these communities have experienced significant growth; however, beneath the averages, we find greater divergence than among the Top 10. A number of cities, especially in Alberta and Saskatchewan, grew rapidly in the first two decades of

9 Mark Partridge, M. Rose Olfert and Alessandro Alasia, "Canadian Cities as Regional Engines of Growth: agglomeration and amenities," *Canadian Journal of Economics* (2007) 40-1: 39-68.

10 The cities included in the calculation of the growth rate are those that belonged to the category at the beginning of the time period. Thus, for the top 10, London, Ont. is included for the 2001–06 calculation; for subsequent periods, Kitchener-Waterloo-Cambridge (Ontario) replaces London.

the century, although the pace of growth slackened in the 2016–20 period. Several B.C. cities, including Kelowna and Abbotsford, as well as cities in the Toronto region, such as Guelph, Ont., Barrie, Ont., and Oshawa, Ont., also experienced significant growth. By contrast, a number of cities in Eastern and Central Canada, including Cape Breton, N.S, Saguenay, Que., Chatham-Kent, Ont. and Thunder Bay, Ont., experienced very slow growth or absolute decline. The example of Chatham-Kent is illustrative of the problems facing many midsize Canadian cities. A centre of the automotive industry, with a large truck manufacturing plant, the city began to stumble through the early years of the century, with layoffs at its largest employer. The Navistar plant, which at its peak employed almost 2,000 workers, stopped production in 2009 and closed permanently in 2011. The population fell by over five per cent from 2001–16 as many residents departed for other parts of the province or the country.

Canada's smaller cities experienced even greater variability in growth rates. A significant number of census agglomerations in the West, including Grande Prairie and Lloydminster, Alta., saw very rapid growth, driven in large part by a booming resource sector. Other growing communities have followed a different path as they have attracted retirees leaving Canada's larger cities. Collingwood, Ont., located 150 kilometres north of Toronto, grew by more than 50 per cent between 2001 and 2020, and now more than a quarter of its residents are 65 and older. The town has grown almost exclusively through migration of people from other parts of Ontario, many from the Toronto area. A number of communities in British Columbia on Vancouver Island and in the Okanagan Valley have also grown in this way. At the other end of the spectrum, many small cities in the Atlantic region, Quebec and Northern Ontario experienced stagnation or decline. In 27 communities, the population declined in each of the three intercensal periods from 2001–16. Bathurst, N.B., for example, saw its population fall from 33,564 in 2001 to 31,110 in 2016 while the median age rose from 40.2 to 51.1.

Chart 1. Median Age of Population by Category of City



In Table 4, we look more closely at the issue of population aging in Canadian cities. The Canadian population as a whole continues to age, a function of low fertility and continuing increases in life expectancy. Thus, it is no surprise that both the median age and the proportion of the population 65 and over are rising in all three categories of cities. Still, it is clear that Canada's largest cities have significantly younger populations. They are magnets for international immigrants and for young people in search of education and employment. The situation is more complex for the midsize and smaller communities, however, as we can see by looking at the range data in Table 4. For many communities, such as Bathurst, N.B., Alma, Que., Kenora, Ont., or Quesnel, B.C., slow growth and outmigration have led to significant population aging. But the growth in retirement migration has added a new dimension to the story. Communities such as Collingwood, Ont., Kelowna, B.C., or Parksville, B.C., have seen significant growth *and* considerable aging. These contrasting patterns underline the distinction made by American demographer William Frey between aging in place and aging through migration.[11] In the U.S., Florida is a classic example of aging through migration, with millions of former residents of the Northeast and Midwest moving at retirement to escape cold winters. By contrast, many declining cities and towns across the nation have experienced aging in place, as older residents, through choice or lack of resources, remain in their home communities, while younger people migrate to places with greater opportunity.

[11] William Frey, "Beyond Social Security: The Local Aspects of an Aging America," The Brookings Institution, June 1, 1999, https://www.brookings.edu/research/beyond-social-security-the-local-aspects-of-an-aging-america/.

Table 4. Per Cent of Population Age 65 and Over by Size of Community 2001–20

Category of City		2001	2006	2011	2016	2020
Top 10	Mean	12.1	12.5	13.4	15.2	16.1
	Range	(9.0–14.3)	(9.4–15.1)	(9.8–16.5)	(11.0–19.2)	(12.6–21.2)
Midsize	Mean	13.8	14.6	15.8	18.2	19.1
	Range	(10.4–18.5)	(11.2–19.0)	(12.1–19.5)	(12.0–25.3)	(13.5–24.3)
Small	Mean	14.2	15.4	17.0	19.8	21.5
	Range	(2.0–31.0)	(2.0–35.8)	(1.9–38.7)	(2.8–43.9)	(4.1–43.5)

Source: Statistics Canada, 2016 Census of Population, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-400-X2016001.

In Table 5, we expand the focus beyond the demographic view to look at a series of economic and social indicators for the three fastest-growing and three slowest-growing communities in both midsize and small urban communities. It is apparent that a faster pace of population growth is usually associated with higher levels of economic well-being. In both categories of cities, average household income is higher and the incidence of low income is lower. The populations of these communities are also more highly educated and more diverse. Of special concern is the significant number of smaller Canadian communities facing decline. As the three examples here show, they are confronting population aging and decline with limited resources. The remaining residents face a difficult future with a weak economic base and often limited personal resources. For older residents to leave these communities would be very difficult, especially as housing costs in larger communities escalate. It will be a challenge for governments to provide the services, especially in health care, that these communities require.

Table 5. Social Indicators for Fastest- and Slowest-Growing Midsize and Small Cities

Indicator	Fastest-Growing			Slowest-Growing		
	Midsize Cities					
	Saskatoon, Sask.	Regina, Sask.	Kelowna, B.C.	Chatham-Kent, Ont.	Saint John, N.B.	Cape Breton, N.S.
Population Increase 2011–20	28.4%	24.4%	23.9%	2.4%	2.1%	-0.9%
Per Cent 65+	13.5%	14.2%	21.5%	22.6%	19.9%	24.6%
Average Household Income 2015	71,261	73,372	62,366	52,667	55,847	47,624
Per Cent Low Income	11.7%	11.2%	12.5%	17.0%	16.7%	19.7%
Per Cent With Degree 25-64	31.4%	30.4%	21.2%	13.1%	23.0%	18.3%
Per Cent Third-Generation	73.7%	68.5%	63.7%	75.4%	88.1%	92.2%
	Small Cities					
	Squamish, B.C.	Whitehorse, Yukon	Collingwood, Ont.	Matane, Que.	Baie-Comeau, Que.	Campbellton, N.B.
Population Increase 2011–20	33.5%	30.0%	27.5%	-4.0%	-5.9%	-8.4%
Per Cent 65+	11.2%	12.5%	28.7%	29.3%	22.2%	24.7%
Average Household Income 2015	75,827	80,315	56,856	43,177	56,858	43,096
Per Cent Low Income	9.7%	0.0%	14.9%	18.0%	9.5%	21.8%
Per Cent with Degree 25-64	31.6%	33.3%	23.9%	13.1%	14.2%	13.5%
Per Cent Third-Generation	59.0%	70.1%	72.1%	96.3%	98.6%	94.2%

Source: Statistics Canada, 2016 Census of Population, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-400-X2016200.

THE ECONOMIC VITALITY OF CANADIAN COMMUNITIES

The economic and social health of communities encompasses a variety of factors: demographic and economic growth are important elements, but so is extending the benefits of growth to all parts of the community. Scholars at the Brookings Institution have examined this issue in the American context and devised a series of measures that they refer to as the Vitality Index.[12] The index includes indicators designed to measure

[12] Ryan Nunn, Jana Parsons and Jay Shambaugh, "The Geography of Prosperity," in *Place-Based Policies for Shared Economic Growth,* The Brookings Institution, The Hamilton Project, Sept. 2018, https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/PBP_FramingChapter_compressed_20190425.pdf.

growth, prosperity, and inclusiveness in American communities. Given data limitations, we cannot replicate fully their approach in the Canadian context, but we have drawn on their model to build an index of the vitality of Canadian cities, large and small.

The Vitality Index consists of six demographic and economic indicators that make use of census data. We have included two demographic measures: the rate of population increase and the net migration rate. The latter, based on both internal and international migration, is an indicator of the attractiveness of the community to other Canadians and newcomers to the country, as well as the ability of communities to retain their own residents. Two other indicators assess the economic status of households: median household income after tax and the rate of increase in household income in the period 2011–16. The fifth measure, the employment rate for persons aged 25 to 64, examines the availability of employment for those in the prime working ages. The final indicator looks at how widespread prosperity is in communities, by measuring the proportion of persons classified as having low income. Full details on the measures are available in Appendix A.

To calculate the index, we first normalized each of the six components, producing a score between zero and 100 on each indicator for each city in the database. One method of forming an index is to treat the indicators as of equal importance and accord each the same weight in the calculation of the index. The alternative is to assess the importance of each by examining the correlations between the individual indicators and an underlying factor. We do this by using a principal-components method of factor analysis. This allows us to attach a distinctive weight to each variable or component. Although the unweighted and weighted indexes are strongly correlated, it is the weighted index we will use in the subsequent analysis.

Population Age 65 and Over by Size of Community shows the distribution of scores across the three categories of cities.[13] All of Canada's 10 largest cities are doing well; indeed, all 10 score above the median for the distribution as a whole. The range of scores is also quite limited. Aside from the two Alberta cities (Calgary at 66.7 and Edmonton at 64.7), the other eight large cities range between 43.5 and 51.7. The higher scores for the Alberta cities reflect the extraordinary demographic and economic growth that characterized much of Western Canada in this time period and is not likely to be seen in the 2016–21 period.

Table 6. Vitality Index Scores by Size of Community 2016

Measure	Top 10	Midsize	Small	All Cities
Mean	51.7	45.1	42.8	43.9
Standard Deviation	7.7	7.9	12.9	11.9
Minimum	43.5	32.4	9.4	9.4
Maximum	66.7	60.8	75.2	75.2
Number of Cities	10	31	111	152

13 The score for each community is available in Appendix C.

The mean score for the 31 midsized cities is lower than for the top 10, and the range somewhat greater. Many of the best performers are again in the West, reflecting the strength of the resource industries, but also the strong showing of a number of B.C. communities, including Kelowna, Abbotsford, and Kamloops. Several of the midsized centres in southern Ontario, such as Guelph, Oshawa, and Barrie, are among the highest scorers, driven by significant population growth and high household incomes. The lowest scores were registered by cities outside the orbit of the major centres, including Saint John, N.B., Trois-Rivieres, Que., Thunder Bay, Ont. and Sudbury, Ont., as well as struggling industrial centres such as Windsor, Ont. And Chatham, Ont.. Windsor, hurt by the problems in the auto industry, was marked by slow population growth, a relatively low employment rate, and a high proportion of persons with low income.

Not surprisingly, the smallest cities have, by far, the greatest variation. The best performers were communities where resource extraction was booming, especially in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Strong migration rates fuelled rapid population growth. High salaries and ready employment produced high levels of household income and low proportions in poverty. Sustaining this level of success will be a challenge in the new economic environment for resources.

Set against the prosperity of many smaller communities in the West is the growing challenge facing many communities in the Atlantic region, in Quebec beyond its two major cities, and in the northern regions of Ontario and British Columbia. Population stagnation or decline and the aging that accompanies it are both a result of and a contributor to economic distress. In many of these small cities, the employment rate for people in the prime working ages is distressingly low and the proportion of individuals living with low income is high.

Although the vitality index is limited by the data available, and thus is an imperfect indicator of the economic and social health of Canadian cities, it does highlight the very different situations experienced by communities small and large. On the whole, Canada's largest cities are doing well. To date, Canada has not seen the contrast evident in the United States between highly successful urban centres, such as Boston and San Francisco, and large metropolitan areas that have experienced decline, such as Detroit and Cleveland. But for Canada's midsize and smaller cities, there is striking divergence and evidence that, for some communities, harder times may lie ahead.

THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC VITALITY

In the final part of this analysis, we explore the factors associated with success as measured by the vitality index. Distinguishing between the measures of success and the determinants of success is not easy. A strong labour market is certainly an indicator of success, but it can also serve as a magnet for immigrants and produce further growth and prosperity. We are also limited by the data available in the censuses. Nevertheless, drawing on the literature on urban growth and decline, we have focused on three important characteristics: education, diversity, and the industrial makeup of the local economy.

The growing importance of technology, finance, research, and the industries that support them, and the relative decline of manufacturing and some resource industries, have elevated the importance of the quality of human capital. Of course, successful economies demand a wide range of skills, but economic success increasingly requires a highly educated labour force. As a measure of this, we include in the analysis the percentage of the population ages 25 to 64 with a bachelor's degree or higher.

A second element of the human-capital story is the importance of a diverse workforce. A growing body of literature points to the positive benefits that flow to organizations with a diverse pool of employees. Diversity of background and identity can bring a richer mix of knowledge and skills, as well as better connections to other communities and societies.[14] While much of this research has focused on organizations, we might expect diversity to produce effects at the community level as well. There is no ideal measure of population diversity, but the census contains an intriguing variable that estimates the proportion of the population who are "third-generation Canadians." If a resident was born in Canada and both their parents were born in Canada, they are classified as third-generation Canadian. Canada's cities differ widely on this measure. In 35 Canadian cities, more than 90 per cent of the population consists of third-generation residents, but among the top 10 only in Quebec City does the proportion of third-generation Canadians exceed 60 per cent. In the Toronto CMA, only 22.4 per cent of residents are classified as third-generation.

A third factor looks at the broader economic setting that has seen some industries grow while others decline. The spectacular growth of the technology industries has boosted the fortunes of a number of urban areas. At the same time, the erosion of the manufacturing sector has been cited as an important factor in the decline of formerly prosperous cities in many countries. Assessing the impact of differences in the industrial makeup of urban areas may help us understand variations in economic performance among Canadian cities. To examine the effects of this trend, we use a measure of the decline in the share of employment in manufacturing over the last 10 years. The variable in the analysis is the percentage-point decline in the proportion employed in the manufacturing sector from 2006 to 2016.

The analysis that follows also includes the log of population as a control variable. Immigrants to Canada are more likely to settle in larger cities and many Canadian-born individuals move to cities to pursue higher education and are likely to remain there. It is important to see if it is simply the larger size of some cities, rather than characteristics such as education and diversity, that produces a higher vitality score. Thus, in the regression analysis that follows, we include the log of total population in 2016.

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14 Jonathan Woetzel, "Inclusive Cities are Productive Cities," McKinsey and Co., April 18, 2016, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/inclusive-cities-are-productive-cities, accessed March 30, 2021.

CORRELATION AND REGRESSION RESULTS

Table 7 presents the correlation coefficients between the variables included in the analysis. As expected, the log of the 2016 population total is significantly associated with both the education and diversity measures. There is no relationship, however, between city size and the extent of decline in manufacturing. Manufacturing is, of course, a diverse industry. It is spread across the country, although it is clearly more important in some areas than in others. Note as well that decline is significantly associated with a lower score on the vitality index.

Table 7. Correlation Coefficients for Variables Included in Analysis of Vitality Index

	Percentage 25-64 with Degree	Percentage Third-Generation	Per Cent Change in Manufacturing 2001–16	Weighted Vitality Index
LN Population	.631	-.463	.013	.123
Percentage 25-64 with Degree		-.496	-.256	.449
Percentage Third-Generation			.159	-.459
Per Cent Change in Manufacturing 2001–16				-.353

Sources: Statistics Canada, "2016 Census of Population," Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-400-X2016200. Statistics Canada, "2016 Census of Population," Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 99-012-X2011034.

Table 8 presents the results of the regression analysis of the vitality index. We first enter the log of population size and then, in the second step, enter the three predictor variables of interest: education, diversity, and the decline in manufacturing. As expected, we note the positive and statistically significant relationship between the log of population size and the weighted index of vitality, although the adjusted proportion variance explained is a modest 0.034. The addition of the three variables of interest changes the situation markedly. The education and population-diversity measures are positively associated with the index, even controlling for population size. A higher proportion of post-secondary graduates is strongly linked to a better vitality score, while cities with a higher proportion of residents who are third-generation or higher Canadians is associated with a lower vitality score. To be sure, the causal nature of these relationships is complex. Struggling communities are likely to lose their well-educated citizens and will have a hard time drawing recent immigrants. But it is also likely true that those with higher-level skills and newcomers with ambition and new ideas help to drive the economy of cities and, in doing so, produce more successful communities.

Table 8. Regression Analysis of Vitality Index for Canadian Cities, 2016

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.084	1	.084	6.117	.015[b]
	Residual	1.878	137	.014		
	Total	1.962	138			
2	Regression	.821	4	.205	24.097	.000[c]
	Residual	1.141	134	.009		
	Total	1.962	138			

a. Dependent Variable: Weighted Index

b. Predictors: (Constant), Log of Population 2016

c. Predictors: (Constant), Log of Population 2016, Change in Manufacture 2001-2016, Percent 3rd Generation, % with degree or higher 25-64 2016

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.222	.085		2.617	.010
	Log of Population 2016	.019	.008	.207	2.473	.015
2	(Constant)	.805	.110		7.347	.000
	Log of Population 2016	-.025	.008	-.267	-2.884	.005
	% with degree or higher 25-64 2016	.007	.002	.452	4.745	.000
	Percent 3rd Generation	-.003	.001	-.363	-4.520	.000
	Change in Manufacture 2001-2016	-.009	.004	-.176	-2.491	.014

a. Dependent Variable: Weighted Index

The question of the industrial makeup of Canadian cities and their relative success is only partly explored here. But it does appear that those communities that have seen a significant erosion of manufacturing employment in recent years are struggling to replace that source of prosperity. Significant declines in manufacturing are associated with slow population growth or even decline, low employment levels, and reduced household income.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Canada's cities have followed very diverse paths over the 19-year period examined in this paper. Strong rates of population growth and rising prosperity have characterized a large number of cities, especially in the West, while stagnation or decline has been the fate of others. Canada's largest cities have, on the whole, prospered. While population growth rates and measures such as household income vary significantly, all of Canada's largest cities continue to grow and, despite the high cost of living in some places, are on solid economic ground. Canada has not seen the economic and demographic decline that has occurred in some larger American cities such as Buffalo, N.Y., Cleveland, and Detroit. Among the midsized and smaller cities, the picture is more mixed. While some have experienced decline and economic hardship, many others have found important niches in the economy and continue to grow.

The story of this period reflects the economic evolution of the country. High commodity prices, especially for oil, drove investment and made many parts of the West a magnet for migrants. This has changed quickly, however, and in the post-2016 period, many previously growing and prosperous communities have seen harder times. Alberta no longer draws in large numbers of interprovincial migrants. Its largest cities, Calgary and Edmonton, are still growing, but at a reduced rate. And some smaller, resource-intensive communities in the West are now seeing population decline.

Our analysis has pointed to the importance of human capital as a determinant of urban vitality. Cities with a more diverse and highly educated population score higher on demographic and economic indicators. It is, of course, not a simple causal relationship. More prosperous places are likely to attract those with better skills, and newcomers to the country have long been drawn to our biggest cities. But the finding points to the undeniable fact that in today's economy, urban places that can attract and promote the highly skilled are more likely to continue to succeed.

The gap we are observing in Canada and elsewhere between the most successful cities and those that are falling behind raises important questions for public policy. Can and should governments attempt to tilt the scales in order to help struggling communities thrive and compete more effectively for new investment with the leading cities? In trying to answer this question, a good deal of humility is required. The changing shape of the urban network is driven by profound shifts in the demographic and economic environment that are not easily influenced by specific policy initiatives. And Canada's record of success with regional development schemes should inspire caution. Yet the prospect of sustained decline in some regions and urban areas and the social problems that accompany such decline have encouraged some analysts to look anew at this issue. Even among economists, usually hostile to place-based policies, there is growing support for exploring ways to help cities and regions that are falling behind.[15] In considering how public policy might influence future trends, there are two possible pathways to follow: one involves altering the current trajectory in order to moderate

15 Benjamin Austen, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence H. Summers, "Saving the Heartland: Place-based Policies in 21st Century America," The Brookings Institution, March 8, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/saving-the-heartland-place-based-policies-in-21st-century-america/.

growth in dominant cities and promote growth in areas that have fallen behind; another focuses on mitigating the effects of decline in struggling cities.

In thinking how current trends might be altered, a crucial element in the Canadian case involves immigrant settlement patterns. With below-replacement fertility rates being the norm in all regions, along with declining rates of internal migration, the ability to attract and retain international immigrants is more important than ever. Canada's three largest cities have been the preferred destination for new immigrants for a long time. The strength of the economies in these cities and the attraction of kin and established communities of people from their homeland largely account for this pattern of settlement. At the beginning of this century, three out of every four new immigrants settled in Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver, with almost half in Toronto. This proportion has declined in recent years, however. Now, a little more than half choose to locate in the three largest cities.[16] The reduced concentration of immigrants in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver likely reflects both changes to immigration policies and economic factors such as the surging cost of housing in these cities.

Looking ahead, efforts to diversify the settlement destinations of newcomers will be even more important. The current government's plan is to increase the annual number of immigrant admissions to approximately 400,000. If current patterns persist, the result would be an addition to the Toronto CMA of over 140,000 newcomers per year. Initiatives such as the Provincial Nominee Program were designed, in part, to help direct more new arrivals to other cities and regions, but the results have been mixed.[17] In some regions, especially Atlantic Canada, there have been challenges in retaining new arrivals under the program. New proposals that make it easier for current temporary residents to remain in the country may promote a broader pattern of settlement. Immigration policy is a contested terrain, but paying attention to the consequences of policy change for settlement patterns is important.

A second approach to closing the gap between growing and declining areas involves targeted investment in selected cities. Atkinson et al. have proposed a competition for cities in the United States that would qualify them for large investments from government as a way to jumpstart tech industries in non-superstar cities.[18] Cities would need to meet a number of criteria and submit proposals for adjudication, with eight to 10 cities being chosen for support. This approach requires very significant investment and there are no guarantees of success. But it is an intriguing idea. The challenge in Canada is the small number of urban areas with sufficient population to justify the kind and amount of investment that Atkinson et al. see as necessary. Still, a modified version

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16 Marc Frenette, "Economic Immigrants in Gateway Cities: Factors Involved in Their Initial Location and Onward Migrations Decisions," Statistics Canada, December 2018, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/11f0019m/11f0019m2018411-eng.pdf?st=R_vlLE9t.

17 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Evaluation of the Provincial Nominee Program," November 2017, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/documents/pdf/english/evaluation/execsum-e1-2015-pnp-en.pdf.

18 Robert D. Atkinson, Mark Muro and Jacob Whiton, "The Case for Growth Centers: How to spread tech innovation across America," The Brookings Institute, ITIF, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Full-Report-Growth-Centers_PDF_BrookingsMetro-BassCenter-ITIF.pdf.

of their scheme might allow a number of Canada's second-tier cities to blossom and produce a stronger urban network across the country.

A third idea involves significant investment in industries located outside large urban areas. With the difficulties faced by many resource industries, including fisheries, mining, and oil and gas, many communities across the country have suffered economic and demographic decline. Looking to the future, there is considerable excitement about new forms of energy, especially hydrogen, as well as the agriculture and food industries. These industries typically operate at a distance from our largest cities and are often supported by smaller cities. Exploring ways to promote investment in these industries might provide a path forward for towns and cities as well as rural areas across the country.

For many smaller cities, especially those at a significant distance from a top 10 city, the focus for public policy will be more on mitigating the effects of population aging and decline. The pandemic has reinforced the importance of delivering high-quality broadband service to communities across Canada. This can be of particular importance in providing better quality and more timely health care to communities that cannot support hospitals. It can also aid in the delivery of improved educational opportunities. Universities and colleges have made extraordinary strides in a short period of time in improving the range and quality of course offerings available through online delivery. This can allow more younger people to remain longer in their home communities while improving their education.

Canada's recent experience of urbanization is far from unique. Low or negative rates of natural increase in many societies mean that the future of communities is tied to their ability to attract and retain migrants. This is far easier for large cities with strength in new and growing industries. Canada will need to experiment with new approaches to meeting the needs of both growing and declining cities and learn from the policy successes in other advanced economies facing a similar challenge.

Finally, we must note the uncertainty about the urban future produced by the COVID-19 pandemic. A fierce debate is growing that pits proponents of agglomeration against those who see the pandemic opening the door to communities marked by lower levels of density.[19] It is too early to determine how the organization of our cities may be affected. Most agree that cities will continue to grow and be home to our leading industries, but the nature of city living may well change with new patterns of remote work. The post-pandemic period may also open new opportunities for midsized cities to lure businesses and workers with more affordable and spacious offices and homes.

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19 Richard Florida, "Will Coronavirus be the Death of Cities? Not So Fast," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/will-coronavirus-be-the-death-of-cities-not-so-fast-11607612400, accessed March 30, 2021.

APPENDIX A

VARIABLES USED TO CALCULATE THE VITALITY INDEX

1. Population Increase: Percentage increase in total population between 2011 and 2016, based on final census data for both years.
2. Net Migration: Net balance of those arriving and leaving, including both internal and international migrants in the period 2011–16.
3. Household Income: Median household income after tax for all households based on income reported for 2015 in the 2016 census.
4. Increase in Household Income: Percentage increase in median after-tax household income between 2010 and 2015, based on 2011 and 2016 census data.
5. Employment Rate: The percentage of adults ages 25–64 who reported being employed or self-employed, either full-time or part-time, during the reference week for the census.
6. Low Income: The percentage of persons of all ages living in households in 2015 classified as falling below the low-income measure, after-tax threshold.

APPENDIX B

VARIABLES USED AS PREDICTORS OF VITALITY INDEX SCORES

1. Education: Proportion of the population ages 25 to 64 who hold a university certificate, diploma, or degree at bachelor level or above. The category includes: bachelor's degree; university certificate or diploma above bachelor level; degree in medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine or optometry; master's degree; and earned doctorate.
2. Diversity: Proportion of the population classified as third-generation Canadians. Third-generation-status Canadians are those persons who were born in Canada with both parents born in Canada.
3. Decline in Manufacturing: The percentage-point decline in the proportion of the labour force employed in industries classified as codes 31 to 33 in the North American Industry Classification System.

APPENDIX C

VITALITY SCORES FOR ALL COMMUNITIES

Low Score		Medium Score		High Score	
Bay Roberts NL	0.330	St. John's NL	0.486	Quebec QC	0.517
Corner Brook NL	0.369	Gander NL	0.448	Sainte-Marie QC	0.534
Grand Falls - Windsor NL	0.320	Charlottetown PEI	0.409	Carleton Place ON	0.561
Summerside PEI	0.324	Halifax NS	0.430	Petawawa ON	0.595
Cape Breton NS	0.202	Moncton NB	0.419	Centre Wellington ON	0.591
Kentville NS	0.310	Fredericton NB	0.412	Oshawa ON	0.525
New Glasgow NS	0.250	Riviere-du-Loup QC	0.410	Ingersoll ON	0.507
Truro NS	0.320	Sept Iles- QC	0.400	Kitchener-Cambridge-Waterloo ON	0.503
Bathurst NB	0.243	Saint Georges QC	0.430	Woodstock ON	0.540
Campbellton NB	0.140	Sherbrooke QC	0.406	Guelph ON	0.557
Edmunston NB	0.305	Cowansville QC	0.406	Wasaga Beach ON	0.527
Miramichi NB	0.285	Victoriaville QC	0.426	Collingwood ON	0.519
Saint John NB	0.330	Drummondville QC	0.415	Barrie ON	0.522
Alma QC	0.332	Granby QC	0.438	Steinbach MB	0.555
Baie-Comeau QC	0.363	Montreal QC	0.435	Thompson MB	0.518
Dolbeau-Mistassini QC	0.299	Val- d'Or QC	0.419	Regina SK	0.608
Joliette QC	0.352	Rouyn-Noranda QC	0.414	Yorkton SK	0.513
Lachute QC	0.239	Ottawa-Gatineau ON	0.494	Swift Current SK	0.580
Matane QC	0.258	Arnprior ON	0.454	Saskatoon SK	0.607
Rimouski QC	0.393	Kingston ON	0.415	Estevan SK	0.576
Saguenay QC	0.369	Cobourg ON	0.419	Weyburn SK	0.550
Salaberry-de-Valleyfield QC	0.320	Port Hope ON	0.480	Brooks AB	0.529
Shawinigan QC	0.248	Kawartha Lakes ON	0.417	Lethbridge AB	0.570
Sorel-Tracy QC	0.302	Toronto ON	0.473	Okotoks AB	0.752
Saint Hyacinthe QC	0.389	Hamilton ON	0.471	High River AB	0.515
Thetford Mines QC	0.327	St. Catharines- Niagara ON	0.403	Calgary AB	0.667
Trois Rivieres QC	0.351	Brantford ON	0.425	Strathmore AB	0.597
Belleville ON	0.389	Tillsonburg ON	0.419	Canmore AB	0.680
Brockville ON	0.347	Norfolk ON	0.424	Red Deer AB	0.575
Chatham-Kent ON	0.324	Stratford ON	0.461	Sylvan Lake AB	0.674
Cornwall ON	0.267	London ON	0.403	Lacombe AB	0.617
Elliot Lake ON	0.094	Greater Sudbury ON	0.408	Camrose AB	0.550
Hawkesbury ON	0.169	Kenora ON	0.427	Edmonton AB	0.647
Leamington ON	0.393	Winnipeg MB	0.491	Lloydminster SK	0.605
Midland ON	0.351	Winkler MB	0.498	Cold Lake AB	0.633
North Bay ON	0.311	Brandon MB	0.494	Grande Prairie AB	0.653
Orillia ON	0.307	Moose Jaw SK	0.487	Wood Buffalo AB	0.710
Owen Sound ON	0.335	North Battleford SK	0.438	Kelowna BC	0.525

Pembroke ON	0.310
Peterborough ON	0.393
Sarnia ON	0.383
Sault Ste. Marie ON	0.315
Thunder Bay ON	0.388
Timmins ON	0.364
Windsor ON	0.378
Portage La Prairie MB	0.346
Duncan BC	0.366
Nelson BC	0.371
Port Alberni	0.262
Powell River BC	0.314
Williams Lake BC	0.390
Prince Rupert BC	0.382
Quesnel BC	0.308
Prince Albert SK	0.412
Medicine Hat AB	0.481
Wetaskiwin AB	0.453
Cranbrook BC	0.453
Penticton BC	0.429
Vernon BC	0.434
Salmon Arm BC	0.432
Kamloops BC	0.476
Chilliwack BC	0.472
Abbotsford BC	0.490
Vancouver BC	0.468
Victoria BC	0.494
Nanaimo BC	0.430
Parksville BC	0.415
Courtenay BC	0.406
Campbell River BC	0.419
Terrace BC	0.453
Prince George BC	0.458
Dawson Creek BC	0.491
Squamish BC	0.664
Fort St. John BC	0.598
Whitehorse YT	0.686
Yellowknife NWT	0.716

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About the Authors

Kevin McQuillan is a demographer and sociologist at The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary. He studied at the University of Toronto and Princeton University. He served as the Dean of Arts and Deputy Provost of the University of Calgary before joining SPP. His current research focuses on the impact of demographic change on cities and rural areas. He is also continuing his work on the influence of religious affiliation and practice on demographic behaviour. His work has appeared in leading journals in demography and sociology, including *Population and Development Review* and the *American Journal of Sociology*.

Michael Laszlo is a Research Assistant at the University of Calgary's School of Public Policy. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Policy Studies from Mount Royal University and Master of Public Policy from the University of Calgary. He has worked for the Canada Border Services Agency on trade policy and tariff classification and wrote his capstone thesis on Canadian import policy. Since graduating he has worked at the University of Calgary doing research for the Alberta Urban Municipality Association on demographic change and economic vitality in Canadian municipalities.

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The School of Public Policy
University of Calgary, Downtown Campus
906 8th Avenue S.W., 5th Floor
Calgary, Alberta T2P 1H9
Phone: 403 210 3802

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